We consider stimulus-response models of learning: an agent chooses an action with a probability, which is increasing in the payo® that has been associated to that action in past periods. A procedure is a speci¯c way of making this association. We say that a procedure is optimal if the sequence of choices it generates converges to the action that maximizes the expected payo®. Which procedures are optimal depends in a substantial way on the information available to the agent. We say that an individual learning in isolation has partial information, because he can only observe the payo® to the action he has chosen; in social learning, he has full information, because he can learn from the action of the others the payo® associated to each action.
Introduction
Stimulus-response models
The stimulus-response models we consider here are the very special class of the learning models that operate according to the Law of E®ect. The Law was formulated for the¯rst time in the doctoral dissertation of Thorndike (see [38] ), and is sometimes also called the Principle of Reinforcement.
The Law of E®ect consists of two basic statements: (i) a reinforcer delivered after a response increases the frequency of that response, and (ii) the response which is strengthened is the one which was temporally contiguous to the delivery of the reinforcer. A reinforcer is, in the language of decision theory or game theory, a positive payo®; and a response is an action taken by the agent (human or animal).
The basic Law has later been re¯ned. First, experimental evidence (which is discussed for instance in [20] ) has shown the need for a more precise concept of what is it that is reinforced in learning. After the 70's this has been identi¯ed in the response probability, i.e. in the probability that the agent chooses a certain action (in [4] , [20] and [32] ). Second, the point (ii) above has been made more precise in the Relative Proximity Principle (see for instance Staddon ([35] ). In particular the strength of an action depends not so much on the value of the corresponding reinforcement, but on its relative value as compared to the one of other actions.
More speci¯cally in this paper we consider learning models where an agent has a set of actions, nature has a set of states, and where:
i. there is summary index of the desirability of each action, its weight, which may be also interpreted as the probability of choosing that action in the current period;
ii. the weights are adjusted in each period according to the received payo®.
The nature of the process, which determines the state, has of course a fundamental importance. We do not restrict the process to be a sequence of independent variables; in particular we consider Markov processes. This is important for the study of the recency phenomenon: a more recent experience has more importance than one farther in the past. This empirical¯nding (see for instance Watson [42] , Guthrie [18] and more recently Shimp [37] ) is quite robust, and is usually interpreted as an adaptive response to a changing environment. It seems optimal in this case to discount, or \forget", experience far in the past, when the environment was more likely di®erent from the present. In section 4 we study this issue; surprisingly, we¯nd that \forgetting" does not improve the performance, even in a Markov environment.
A critical assumption is maintained throughout: the process on the state is independent of the action taken by the agent. This assumption is often violated in experiments, for instance those with variable interval schedules, like the experiments motivating the research of Herrnstein [20] . For a¯rst analysis of this case, see Lettau and Uhlig ([25] ).
Motivations of this research
The topic of learning in stimulus-response models now belongs to a growing literature in economics (see for instance [1] for an early contribution along these lines, and [33] , [11] , [29] for a more extended discussion of related papers). This literature studies models of learning and decision making motivated by the following general idea. In a complex environment (in particular when the \objective" state space is very large) an agent may prefer to follow decision rules which do not require him to rely on a clear picture of the state space. Rather, he may try and evaluate the desirability of an action simply on the basis of past performances. In these models the elements that are necessary for a decision are simply histories of actions and payo®s; the space of states of nature, and the process on it, may be part of the model used by the theorist, but not directly of decision process of the agent.
These contributions in economic theory were preceded by a large literature on mathematical models of learning, originated by the work of mathematical psychologists in the 50's, in particular Estes (see for instance [12] , [13] ), and Bush and Mosteller ( [7] , [8] ). This research builds in large part on the initial insights of Thorndike and the experimental and theoretical work of Skinner. This literature reached a state of maturity by the early 70's, and is summarized in extremely informative books like [30] and [23] (but see also [9] for an early example). Also, mathematical models of learning in this tradition¯nd a unifying and elegant setup in the theory of random systems with complete connections (which are used, and brie°y discussed, in the present paper.)
This seems, all in all, an old and closed subject of research. One good reason for reviving it is the following: the literature we have described never analyses in depth the issue of optimality properties of the learning models; probably because this literature was almost exclusively motivated by research in psychology. Rather, in this literature a stochastic process of learning is postulated, and the emphasis is on the study of its asymptotic properties. The main objective is to formulate plausible learning procedures that would match experimental evidence.
But an economist (or a game theorist) may have in mind a di®erent issue, which is the one we address here. Di®erent procedures may asymptotically choose di®erent actions. We may not want to require the subject to be rational in his choice of actions (because the problem he is facing might be too complex, or because the variety of problems he is facing is too large). Still we may require him to be rational in his choice of procedures. It becomes important therefore to characterize the optimality properties of di®erent procedures. For instance we may want him to select those procedures that choose, in di®erent problems, the action that maximizes the expected payo®. This is the criterion we use in this paper; (see Easley and Rustichini [10] for an axiomatic analysis along these lines, and BÄ orgers, Morales and Sarin [5] for a recent interesting paper.)
Informational aspects of reinforcement
There is however a second reason, and a second motivation for the present paper. The general principle of reinforcement as a complete theory of learning was already criticized in the psychology literature 1 because this model does not adequately keep into account the informational aspects of reinforcement. In fact the reward may be, besides an immediate source of motivation, also a source of information; and the subject might keep both elements into account in his learning process. This factor might be of particular importance in human learning, as compared to animal learning; although a¯rst version of this criticism of the simple law of e®ect came from studies of behavior in rats (see Tolman and Honzik ( [41] ). One may see in these early contributions the beginning of the transition, in psychology, to the \cognitive" point of view.
This criticism found strong support in the experimental evidence. One example of this evidence may be help to clarify the criticism and its motivation. In the Never Right experiment (reported for instance in Estes [16] ) the subject (human, this time) had to choose an action, which could be \right" or \wrong", and predict the reward he would receive. After the choice of the action the subject was told if the action was wrong (in which case he would receive no further information and no reward) or right. In this second case he would receive a reward if and only if he had also predicted the right reward. The experiment was setup in two di®erent ways: either with a random determination of the right reward (the random setup), or in such a way, somewhat perverse, that the prediction of the subject would always be wrong (the Never Right setup). The experiments did not show any signi¯cant di®erence in the learning of the right action between subjects in the random and in the \never right" setup. Since the reward for the choice of the correct action was very di®erent in the two setups, this experiment seemed to directly contradict the Law of E®ect.
One way of interpreting this criticism does not seem to undermine the general idea of the reinforcement principle: rather it points out the need for a careful description in the model of the information available to the subject. Estes himself ( [16] ) for instance, commenting on the \Never Right" one can see close analogies between the experiment and many situations in everyday life, and argues:
People are often heard to wonder why the inveterate looser at picking horses or dabbling in the stock market does not pro¯t from his experience and give up his unpro¯table ways. The answer is [...] that an individual's experience includes not only his own choices and their outcomes but also his observations of the choices of the others, some of whom may reap large rewards.
In this paper we explore in a systematic way this point of view: reinforcement is di®erent in di®erent informational setups. In particular the condition of a subject learning in isolation is completely di®erent from the one of a subject learning in a group: in the latter case the individual may learn from the experience of the others. Of course once this di®erent setup is clearly speci¯ed, the implication from the point of view of the characterization of optimal procedures may be extreme. In this paper we show that they are in fact extreme. More precisely, we model two di®erent informational environments, full and partial information respectively (see section 2). One possible interpretation of this distinction is the following. The partial information corresponds to the situation of an individual learning in isolation: he has available only the evidence that is produced by his own choices. On the other hand, the full information setup corresponds to the situation of an individual experimenting in a large group of similar independent subjects, who can also observe the experience of the others.
In the paper we compare the relative performance, in these di®erent environments, of two widely used procedures: the linear adjustment and the exponential adjustment procedures. We will see that the procedure, which is optimal in the two di®erent circumstances, is very di®erent. In fact they are opposite: what fails in one setup succeeds in the other, and vice versa. But we are now ready for a more formal discussion of our model. The reader who wants to skip (at least for the moment) the technical details may read now the section of conclusions (7), which outlines the main results to the questions posed in the introduction.
Contents of the paper
The paper is organized as follows. In section 3 we study the partial information case. We consider¯rst (see the two sections 3.1, 4) two possible variations of a linear adjustment procedure; and we then consider (3.2) the exponential adjustment procedure. In section 5 we analyze the full information case. In these sections we reduce the analysis of the asymptotic behavior to the associated ordinary di®erential equation that, from the theory of stochastic approximation, completely determines this behavior. A special ODE assumes great importance: the equation (3.8) . It arises rst in the linear adjustment, full information case, but then appears, in slightly di®erent form, in the model of \forgetting" and then in the exponential adjustment, full information case (5.29) . In all this instances this equation determines the convergence to the action that maximizes the expected payo®; it is also the only one we encounter that has this property.
In all these sections the stochastic process on the state is assumed to be Markov: but the only relevant feature of the process is its invariant distribution. In section 6 we try to formulate and analyze procedures that are more adequate for a changing environment.
The main conclusions are reported and discussed in section 7. In the appendix (section 8) we collect a few technical results and their proofs in stochastic approximation theory, (which are extension of known results) that are needed in the main text. The section 8.2 collects basic notions and results in the theory of random systems with complete connections.
The learning problem
There is a¯nite set of states, J = f1; 2; : : : ; Jg, and a¯nite set of actions I = f1; 2; : : : ; Ig.
2 In each period one of the states is chosen (by \nature") according to a stochastic process. The transition among states is determined by a Markov chain with transition probability matrix (p ij ) : (i; j) 2 J £ J. We assume Assumption 2.1 The stochastic process on J is ergodic, with a unique invariant measure on J denoted by º ¤ .
In each period also an action is chosen, and according to the action and the state for that period, a payo® is received; the payo® to the action i in state j is denoted by ¼ ij . Without loss of generality, we assume that payo®s are non-negative. The state at time t is denoted by s t , and the j-th state is denoted by s j . We recall that by Breiman's strong law for Markov processes ( [6] ) and assumption 2.1,
for every f 2 R J .
Full and partial information
As we mentioned, we are going to distinguish two fundamentally di®erent cases. For convenience, and for reasons that should become immediately clear, we shall refer to them respectively as the partial information and the full information case. We may think that in the¯rst case the only information, which is provided after the choice of action, is the payo® corresponding to that action. This implies, in terms of the process on weights, that the new weight may only depend on the history of the received payo®s including the present. Of course this dependence may be indirect, for instance through the previous weights.
Conversely in the second case we may think that the entire vector of payo®s, to the chosen action as well as to the others, is part of the information. So the process may have the new weight depend on the past value, and on the entire vector of payo®s of that period. In this case the choice of action in the full information case has no informational consequence.
The weights depend on the sum of the payo®s to the action: so we need to de¯ne carefully the notion of payo® in the two cases.
In the partial information case the payo® ¼ i t to action i at time t is a random variable which depends on two events: one that determines the state j t and another that determines the action i t for that period. It is convenient to set up a notation that assigns a zero payo® to the actions that are not chosen. Formally we de¯ne the function ¦ P : I £ J ! R I by:
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0 is given and positive. This initial value is necessary for the procedure to be well de¯ned in the¯rst period. The total sum of payo®s attributed up to time t to all actions is denoted by S t´Pi S i t : A vector of weights is an element µ 2 ¢(I), where ¢(I) is the I ¡1-dimensional simplex; the interpretation, that we shall discuss more in detail later, is that the action i is chosen at time t with probability µ ( .4
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for t¸0; i 2 I, where h¢; ¢i denotes the inner product. The function H from ¢(I)£R I de¯ned by:
for every i 2 I has expectation, taken with respect to the invariant measure on the state, and the vector µ, equal to
We have now to show that the term (S t + he; ¼ t+1 i) ¡1 multiplying the function H has the property of being square summable, but not summable: this is the familiar stochastic approximation condition, presented for instance in theorem 4 of [3] or in theorem 1, page 691, of [26] .
Note that the random variable S t is such that:
a.s. for every t, so
Now de¯ne the ODE, for some given value a 2 ¢(I):
and let £(t; a); t¸0;
be the solution of the equation (3.11) . In the following lemma we collect few very easy facts about this equation:
Proof. A simple computation shows that
is the variance var(m) of the random variable which takes the value m I with probability µ i , which is strictly positive when the vector µ is not one of the vertices of ¢(I). The second point follows immediately from the assumption that m 1 > m i for every i 6 = 1.
We can say that the mean¯tness hµ; mi increases on the solution paths of the equation (3.11).
Now from the theorem 4 of [3] (see also the theorem 1, page 691, of [26] ) the process of weights converges almost surely to the vector with full weight on the¯rst action; that is, the process converges to the action that maximizes the expected payo®, where the expectation is taken with respect to the invariant measure on the state space J. To summarize:
The linear adjustment process on weights decribed by (3.5) converges almost surely to the action that maximizes the expected payo®.
Exponential adjustment
We now consider the exponential adjustment on weights, de¯ned by:
; for a given µ i 0 (3.12)
for i 2 I; t¸0, and some given initial value of S i 0 ; i 2 I. The immediate advantage of this procedure is, of course, that the convergence to the limit point is much faster. We prove here that there is a large price attached to this: the main result of this section is that the limit behavior is quite di®erent from the one obtained in the linear adjustment. The process does not converge to the action that maximizes the expected payo®, unless the initial conditions are in the basin of attraction of the corresponding extreme point. The main result is reported in the proposition (3.4).
As in the previous case, we¯rst reduce the process in (refeq:expad) to a more convenient form, given below in (3.18).
If we denote:
for i 2 I, µ 2 ¢(I); ¼ 2 R I , then the equation (3.12) may be rewritten as:
for some appropriate vector S 0 . Note that g(µ; ¼; 1) = µ; (3.15) also the function g(µ; ¼; ¢) is continuously di®erentiable, with derivative:
From (3.15) and (3.17) we can write:
The equation describes the evolution of the weights as the sum of the value in the previous period, plus a term multiplied by an adjustment factor°¡ 1. As°tends to 1, the behavior of the process is determined by the term g°(µ t ; ¼ t+1 ; 1). This intuition is made precise by the two theorems in section 8.1 (namely theorem 8.3 and theorem 8.9). They show that the asymptotic behavior of the process described by the equation (3.12) is determined, as°tends to 1, by the di®erential equation _ µ(t) = h(µ(t)) where h(µ) is de¯ned by taking the expectation of the function g°(µ; ¼; 1) with respect to the invariant distribution on the state space, and the probability on the action set induced by µ. The di®erential equation we obtain in this way is the selection equation:
for i 2 I, where M is the diagonal matrix with
and M jk = 0 if j 6 = k. In the next subsection we study this equation, and determine the asymptotic behavior of the process.
The selection equation
The selection equation (3.19) , in the general case in which M is symmetric matrix, is well known in the literature on dynamical systems arising from evolutionary models (see for instance chapter 23 of [21] ). We recall here the main properties, for the special case in which M is a diagonal matrix.
First, the di®erential equation has a unique interior steady state, given by
It is known (see chapter 23 of [21] ) that an interior steady state µ 0 is stable if and only if µ 0 M µ 0 < 0; so in our case the point µ ¤ is unstable. In fact the set of asymptotically stable steady states of the equation is easy to describe: Lemma 3.3 The set of asymptotically stable steady states of the selection equation (3.19 ) is the set of extreme points of the simplex.
Proof. It is known (see for this point [21] , chapter 23) that the average¯tness function V (µ)´µM µ is a strict Liapunov function for the selection equation. In fact the average¯tness strictly increases along the solution trajectories, and therefore the set of asymptotically stable steady states coincides with the set of strict local maxima of the¯tness function. But we claim that the set of local maxima of this function is the set of extreme points.
To prove this we proceed by induction on the dimension n of the simplex, as follows. For n = 1 the proof is obvious. For any n + 1, note¯rst that since the average¯tness function is a convex function, the local maxima are at the boundary of the simplex. Now apply the induction hypothesis to the n-dimensional components of the boundary on the n + 1-dimensional simplex.
Note that there are steady states at the boundary which are not extreme points: they are however unstable.
Now from the two quoted theorems in section 8.1 we derive that the limit behavior of the stochastic process on weights in the case of the exponential adjustment, partial information follows closely, as°tends to 1, the solution paths of the ODE (3.19). We refer the reader to that section for details on the di®erent results. In each case it is very easy to verify that the assumptions of the di®erent theorems are satis¯ed. In particular for instance the functions h and g are continuously di®erentiable. To summarize:
Proposition 3.4 The exponential adjustment process on weights described by (3.12) converges almost surely to one of the extreme points of the simplex. In particular, it converges to the action that maximizes the expected payo® only if the initial weight is in the basin of attraction of the corresponding extreme point.
For example, when I = f1; 2g,
and the process converges to the optimal action 1, for°small enough, if the initial weight µ 0 > µ 1 ¤ . In a di®erent paper (see [34] ) we prove that the probability of converging to each of the extreme points is a continuous function of the initial weight.
Forgetting
It may seem reasonable to assume that in a changing environment an adjustment rule that \forgets", or discounts, earlier evidence should perform better than one that gives equal importance to every experience. The reason is that more recent events are more relevant, because they are more likely to be determined by the environment as it is now. We are going to see that forgetting does not accomplish this.
A model where the payo® from actions further in the past is discounted exponentially appears¯rst in Hartley ( [19] , page 617; see also [28] ). The same model is also in Roth and Erev ([33] , page 175). In this model the forgetting parameter is 2 (0; 1), and the cumulative payo® is:
for every i 2 I; t¸0; so that:
for every i 2 I; t¸0. Analogously to S t we de¯ne S(¯) t´Pi2I S(¯) i t . For this discounted sum of payo®s, and for a given initial vector S(¯) i 0 , the weights are de¯ned as: 
for every i 2 I; t¸0. A heuristic argument suggests the limit behavior of the process described by the equation (4.24). For any history of payo®s, the discounted sum S(¯) t has a non-zero value. The quantity (S(¯) t1 ¡¯+ he; ¼ t+1 i) ¡1 can be made arbitrarily small by choosing values of¯close to 1, so the process described by the equation (4.24) is similar to a stochastic approximation process with constant gain of the form µ
The limit of this process for small ² is easy to¯nd. This is done in the next theorem, where we also prove that the heuristic argument provides the right answer.
Theorem 4.1 For all¯su±ciently close to 1, and for all ² > 0 there is a constant C(¯) such that: lim sup
and C(¯) tends to zero as¯tends to 1.
The proof is omitted for simplicity: it uses the theorem 15, chapter 4, part II, page 335 of [3] (see also the theorem 3, chapter 2, part I, page 44). Notice that the stochastic process on the states a®ects the limit point of the weights only through the invariant measure.
Full information
In the full information case there is no need for stochastic approximation theorems to characterize the asymptotic behavior of the process on weights. Simpler proofs are possible, which rely on appropriate versions of the law of large numbers. We think it is instructive however to study the limit process on the weights in this case. This will make the comparison with the results in the partial information case more direct. As we shall see, the learning process in the full information case has features, which are symmetrically opposite to the partial information case. The formulation of the problem as a stochastic approximation problem will make this point particularly clear.
Linear adjustment
Formally the process on weights is de¯ned as in the partial information case (see the equation (3.5)). Recall however that in the de¯nition of the sums S i t and S t the payo®s are de¯ned as in (2.3). To compare this result with the one for the corresponding situation in the partial information case we treat the problem as a stochastic approximation process. As in the case of the partial information we can derive with a simple rearrangement that:
The di®erential equation associated with the process in (5.25) is:
for i 2 I, which has the unique, asymptotically stable steady state µ ¤ . Solving for the steady state of the di®erential equation, and using an argument similar to the one developed for the linear adjustment rule with forgetting in section 4 one can give a di®erent proof of the proposition 5.1.
Exponential adjustment
Consider now the exponential adjustment rule for the full information. The function g in this case is de¯ned as in equation (3.13) . The process of the weights is de¯ned by µ t+1 = g(µ t ; ¼ t+1 ;°); (5.27) Recall that in this case the vector of payo®s is ¼ t = (¼ 1s t+1 ; : : : ; ¼ Is t+1 ). In this case too the asymptotic behavior of the weights is immediate: Proposition 5.2 The process of weights converges almost surely to the vector e 1 .
Proof. The proof of this statement is clear once we rewrite the adjustment process as: µ i t+1
and apply again Breiman's strong law.
Again it may be instructive to treat this as a stochastic approximation problem. In this way we can compare the di®erential equation associated to the process for the full information case with that of the process for the partial information case. When we take the expectation of the function g°(µ; ¼; 1) with respect to the invariant measure on the states we derive the di®erential equation:
for i 2 I, which is exactly the equation (3.8) that we have derived for the linear adjustment rule in the partial information case. In other words, in the full information case the exponential adjustment rule converges to the action that maximizes the expected payo®, as the linear adjustment rule does in the partial information case, because they both converge to the same limit process: the ODE (3.8 ).
Facing a changing environment
A common feature of the adjustment rules on weights that we have considered in the previous section is the following: the changes in the environment are \averaged out". For instance in the case of a Markov process on states, the only aspect which is relevant in determining the limit is the invariant measure over the states, and no other feature of the process itself matters. In fact, the process on weights converges to an action which is optimal with respect to this average. This is of course typically far less than optimal: it may also be worse than what can be achieved by relatively simple procedures, which try to adjust to the process more closely. To illustrate this point, consider the following example.
Example. Take a model with two states and two actions. Let p 11 = p 22 : the transition is symmetric, and the stationary distribution is uniform. The adjustment rules that we have seen choose asymptotically the action that solves max i (¼ i1 + ¼ i2 ). This is clearly not necessarily the best long run average payo®; for instance in the case of
gives an average payo® of 2, while the simple rule of choosing the best action for the previous period state gives a larger average payo®, of (3=2)p 11 + 1.
Clearly this is a limitation which is common to any adjustment process in which the weight on actions converges to a limit: by this very fact, the adjustment process will eventually be insensitive to the di®erent values of j t . Therefore, any general theorem that provides conditions for convergence of the weights will necessarily ignore some important aspect.
In fact the appropriate structure should concentrate on the joint process on state and weights. The appropriate theoretical structure to do this is provided by the theory of Random System with Complete Connections. We report the basic notions in the section 8.2.
In this section we show that a relatively simple modi¯cation (in fact, a very small perturbation) of the adjustment rules we have discussed earlier already provides a better procedure.
Full information, exponential adjustment
Consider the process described by:
where the function g corresponds to the exponential adjustment process, that is:
for every i 2 I. When ² is very small, this may be considered a small perturbation of the adjustment rule we have seen previously. In the next proposition 6.1 we shall see that the asymptotic behavior is however completely di®erent.
Denote b(k)´argmax i ¼ ik , the best action in state k. The proposition describes the limit behavior of the joint process of weights on actions and state, which is de¯ned by the equation (6.30) (for the weights) and the given Markov process on states. We denote, as in the section 8.2, w t = (µ t¡1 ; j t¡1 ); and we endow the space W´¢(I) £ J with the product ¾-algebra (recall that we have the Borel structure on ¢(I)). Proposition 6.1 For every ² > 0 there is a°² such that for any°¸°²: (i) the process fw t g t¸0 is ergodic, with a unique invariant distribution ¿ ; (ii) if we write ¿ (k; O) = (º ¤k )½ k (O) for every k and any measurable O µ ¢(I), then
Remark. Of course this adjustment rule is a \good" rule only when, loosely speaking, the terms p kk are large. In particular the average limit payo® can be made arbitrarily close to
Proof. Note¯rst that for every t¸1 and every i 2 I, µ
, where e b(k) is the J vector with 1 in the b(k) position and zero otherwise. Therefore we can choose°² so that for every k 2 J, µ 2 ¢
The ergodicity of the process is immediate from theorem [22] . The second claim is immediate from the de¯nition of°².
Recall that the exponential adjustment, in the case of full information, chooses the action which maximizes the average payo®, with respect to the invariant distribution on states, independently of the value of°.
The intuitive reason for the result we have just seen, and in particular for the important role that the speed of adjustment represented by°now has, is simple to see. As°becomes large, the process on weights converges almost within the period to the action that maximizes the payo® in the state of that period.
Partial information
The same process, applied in the partial information case, has an extremely poor performance. Let ® i 2 ¢(I) be de¯ned, for every i 2 I: ® i (j) = ²=I; j 6 = i; ® i (i) = 1 ¡ ². Then the process is ergodic for°large enough, and the invariant measure tends to a uniform distribution on the di®erent actions. More precisely: Proposition 6.2 i. For every ² > 0 there is a°² such that for any°¸°², the process fw t g t¸0 is ergodic, with a unique invariant distribution ¿ ;
ii. as°! 1 the invariant measure tends to ¿ , where if we write:
for every k and any measurable O µ ¢(I),
for every k.
Proof. The matrix g µ (µ; ¼;°) of derivatives of the function g with respect to µ is easily seen to be: From the two equations (6.31) and (6.32) it is easy to see that there is a°large enough so that for any µ 2 ¢ ² (I) the norm of the matrix is less than 1. 
Hence the condition of the theorem 2. 
Conclusions
The paper has analyzed stimulus response models. In these models an action is chosen in each period with some probability. The ratio between the probability of choosing one out of two actions depends on the ratio of the cumulative payo®s to those two actions, or the ratio between some monotonic transformation of them. The speci¯c form of this dependence may be de¯ned a procedure. We say that an action is eventually chosen if the probability of choosing it tends to one. Which action is eventually chosen depends crucially on two factors: the speci¯c procedure adopted, and the information available. In this paper we have considered the two most common procedures: the linear one (see the equation 3.5 above for a precise formulation) and the exponential one (see the equation 3.12).
The second important factor we consider is the amount of information available. With partial information only the payo® to the action that has been chosen is observed; with full information the payo® to all the actions, whether they are chosen or not, is observed.
In this paper we choose a simple criterion to order the di®erent procedures: a procedure is better than another if it gives convergence to the action that maximizes the expected payo®. It may seem that the full information unambiguously dominate the partial information. While this is obviously true for agents who maximize, it is no longer true in stimulus-response models.
The main result is that while exponential procedures are better than the linear ones for the full information case, linear procedures are optimal for the partial information case.
In fact with linear procedures and the partial information the convergence is slower than with exponential procedures and full information. But the process tends to the optimal action, while with the linear procedures and partial information the process converges to the optimal point only if the initial condition is right.
The intuitive reason for the di®erent performance of the partial and full information models is in the speed of convergence of the two procedures. Linear procedures are slower to converge to the limit point: but their rate of convergence is the appropriate one for the partial information case. They are however too slow for the full information case. The vector of probabilities converges to an interior point, rather to the optimal action. This di®erence is made particularly clear by the stochastic approximation theorems, which reduce the study of the limit point to the study of the rest point of the two equations (3.8) (for the linear case) and (3.19) (for the exponential case) in the case of partial information; and of the equations (5.26) and (5.29) respectively for the full information case.
The second main result points out a deeper reason for the¯rst conclusion. The linear procedure in the partial information and the exponential procedure in the full information case select the optimal action because they both approximate the same equation: see (3.8) and (5.29) respectively.
We may now return to our opening review of the literature on learning. Models based on the reinforcement principle seem, after all, able to deal both with the situation of an individual learning in isolation (where the informational aspects of reinforcement are negligible) and of an individual learning is a social environment. The di®erence in the information available to him will however produce a di®erent structure of the procedure, which is appropriate to the two cases. Since most of the learning, which is relevant for economics, is social learning, this conclusion seems to indicate that exponential procedures are more appropriate in this context. Bayesian learning is, after all, a particular form of exponential procedure (on this see Easley and Rustichini, [10] ).
Appendix

Stochastic approximation results
In this section we collect several of the results in stochastic approximation that are needed in the main text. We begin with some preliminaries on the theory of approximation of semigroups that are needed in the proof of our theorem 8.3 below.
Semigroups and Approximations
Let X be a Banach space. A one parameter family T (t); 0 · t < 1 of bounded linear operators from X to X is a semigroup of bounded linear operators if: i. T (0) = I, (I is the identity operator on X);
ii. T (t + s) = T (t)T (s) for every t; s¸0.
The second property above is called the semigroup property. A semigroup of bounded linear operators is said to be strongly continuous if:
Such a semigroup is usually called a C 0 semigroup. It is said to be a semigroup of contractions if k T (t) k· 1; for every t¸0:
where k ¢ k is the operator norm. All the semigroup we are going to consider are semigroups of contractions. The linear operator A (possibly unbounded) de¯ned by:
and
is called the in¯nitesimal generator of the semigroup T (t); 0 · t < 1, with domain D(A). Of course the limit in ( 8.35) has to exists with respect to the norm in X.
We are going to apply the theory to semigroups generated by stochastic processes, in particular Markov processes. We need a few basic notions from the theory of weak convergence of stochastic processes. As usual we de¯ne D ¢(I) [0; 1) as the set: The topology on D ¢(I) [0; 1) is the one induced by a metric d which generalizes the Skhorokod topology. Precise de¯nition and properties of d are not directly relevant here: so we refer the reader for a detailed analysis to [2] , pages 111-115, [24] , chapter 2, and also [3] , chapter 4 of the Part II. We recall however that since ¢(I) with the Euclidean topology is complete and separable, also (D ¢ (I) [0; 1); d) is complete and separable.
The convergence of stochastic processes with sample paths in D ¢(I) [0; 1) is now de¯ned through the weak convergence of probability measures on this space. That is, a stochastic process with sample paths in D ¢(I) [0; 1) is considered as a random variable on that metric space, and is said to converge weakly to X, denoted X n ) X, if and only if the distribution of X n converges to the distribution of X. Recall that (see for example [24] , page 13, theorem 2.9) if X n and X are processes with sample paths in D ¢(I) [0; 1), and the sequence fX n g n¸0 is relatively compact, then X n ) X if and only if (X n (t 1 ); : : : ; X n (t k )) ) (X(t 1 ); : : : ; X n (t k )) for every subset (t 1 ; : : : ; t k ) of the rationals.
Stochastic Approximation with constant gain
We de¯ne now our basic stochastic approximation problem, which includes as applications the problems we have seen in the previous sections. With J the state space, I the action set, both¯nite, we have a stochastic process on weights, that is on elements of ¢(I), de¯ned as follows. In each period a stochastic process on J determines the new state s t+1 . Recall we have assumed:
The process on the state space J is Markov, ergodic, with a unique invariant distribution º ¤ .
Then an action a t+1 is chosen according to the probability µ t : to this pair of state and action, s t+1 = j and a t+1 = i respectively, corresponds a payo® ¼ t+1 = ¦(i; j); the precise de¯nition of the function ¦ di®ers as we know in the two cases of full and partial information (see the equations (2.2) and (2.3)). Then the new weight µ t+1 is determined according to: 8.38) for t = 0; 1; : : :. This de¯nes a stochastic process that we denote µ°t ; we write µ°t (a) to indicate the initial distribution on the process concentrated on a, i.e. the process with µ°0 = a almost surely. We denote:
for i 2 I. In keeping with our applications we consider°close to 1: and for convenience we denote ±´°¡ 1: (8.40)
Finally we denote the function H : ¢(I) £ ¢(J) ! R I for each µ and º as the expectation of the function H(µ; ¢) with respect to µ and º:
for every k 2 I, and h(µ)´H(µ; º ¤ ): (8.42) We want to prove that as°tends to 1 the process described above, with initial condition µ°0 = a, converges weakly to the solution of the ordinary di®erential equation:
We assume:
The functions g and h are continuously di®erentiable.
We denote by £(t; a); t¸0;
the value at time t of the solution of (8.43 ). In the following we present a simple proof, based on approximation theory of semigroups, of the weak convergence of the process (8.38) . The main idea of the proof, and more generally of the approximation technique for semigroups, is the following: it is easy to prove directly that the in¯nitesimal 3 It may be useful to explicitly relate the notation of [3] and the one of [24] , or [17] . Let fµ n ; n = 0; 1; : : :g a given discrete time stochastic process. and ® > 0. [3] de¯ne a continuous time process: µ ® (t)´µ n for n® · t · (n + 1)® while we (and so [24] ) have de¯ned in the equation (8.44) a continuous time process by: µ [®t] . The two are related by:
generators of the stochastic process µ°[ ¹t] ; t¸0 converge to the in¯nitesimal generator corresponding to the ODE (8.43). The approximation theorems insure that this convergence implies convergence of the corresponding semigroups, and therefore the weak convergence of the processes. The technique (in particular in the case of semigroups generated by Markov processes) is discussed in detail in [24] and [17] . The precise statement of our approximation result is the following: as ¹ = (°¡ 1) ¡1 ! 1; so it su±ces to prove the convergence in (8.49 ). This will follow from theorem 4.4, chapter 4, page 26, of [24] and the lemma 8.5 below. The in¯nitesimal generator corresponding to the process µ ¹;°( t) has domain D(A ¹;°) = D(A) and is de¯ned by:
The following lemma follows immediately if one writes the¯rst order Taylor expansion in the variable°of (8.50), which is admissible for any f 2 D(A ¹;°) = D(A).
The method of Gaussian Di®usion
In this section we consider a di®erent method, which is based on an extension of the results of the chapter 4, part II, of [3] adapted to our case. The constantgain stochastic approximation problem is as described in the previous section. The conditions we imposed on the process are enough to insure that the assumption A1 of [3] are satis¯ed. We also assume that:
The ODE has a¯nite number of isolated locally stable steady state points;
and denote this set by SS. We also assume that:
has eigenvalues with strictly negative real parts.
For every µ ¤ 2 SS, denote
i.e. the basin of attraction of the point µ ¤ . We strengthen our assumption 8.2 to Assumption 8.8 h is twice continuously di®erentiable.
We can now state:
Theorem 8.9 For any initial a 2 B(µ ¤ ), there is some°small enough such that:
where the constant C(°) tends to zero as°tends to zero.
Proof. The proof follows the proof of theorem 3, section 2.2.3.1, page 44, of [3] , which depends critically on the assumption that the ODE is globally stable, with a unique stable steady state (this is assumption (A.2a), page 44 of [3] ). We indicate here the main modi¯cations that are necessary because this assumption is not satis¯ed.
The proof of the theorem 3 of [3] proceeds in two main steps.
First the process U ± (t) is de¯ned as:
i.e. the di®erence between the process with parameter°and step size ± =°¡ 1, and the solution of the ODE, blown up by the factor ± ¡1=2 . The limit behavior of this process as ± tends to zero is studied in the Gaussian approximation theorem ( [3] , theorem 7, page 322), which states that the distributions of the processes U ± converge weakly, as ± tends to zero, to the distribution of a Gaussian di®usion with appropriate coe±cients. The Gaussian approximation theorem holds in our case, since it depends on the assumptions (A.2), (A.3), (A.4) , (A'.5) and (A.8) of [3] . But (A. The second step of the proof of theorem 3, section 2.2.3.1 of [3] is developed in section 4.6 of chapter 4 of Part II. The idea of this section is to write the process U ± (t) as:
where h 0 is the matrix of derivatives of the function h ; M ± (t) and N ± (t) are two stochastic processes. The equation (8.52 ) descibes an ODE with time varying coe±-cients; we denote ¡(t; s) the fundamental solution of the corresponding homogeneous equation. The critical condition used by [3] is that k ¡(t; s) k· e ®(t¡s) (8.53) for some ® > 0. We provide a similar estimate for t = T 1 large enough, and use theorem 1 of section 2.2 for the initial interval [0;
Here are the details of this third step. By the assumptions 8. 8 and 8.7 there is an open set around the point µ ¤ such that the eigenvalues of the matrix @h i @µ j (µ ¤ ) are uniformly bounded away from zero, and negative, in this set. Now choose a time T 1 large enough so that £(t; a) is contained in this open set for t¸T 1 .
From theorem 1 of section 2.2 of [3] for°su±ciently close to 1:
Now note that there exists an ® > 0 such that for any t¸T 1 the eigenvalues of the matrix @h i @µ j (£(t; a)) have real part less or equal to ¡®. Hence the exponential estimate (8.53) (that is, the equation 4.6.2 of section 4.6.2 of [3] ) holds for any t¸T 1 . Now the proposition 17, page 338, of [3] holds with the same proof, and therefore also the¯nal argument in section 4:6:4 holds. Hence there is a constant C 2 (°) such that:
Now combine (8.54) and (8.55), choosing the maximum of the two constants C 1 (°; T 1 ) and C 2 (°; a) to obtain the¯nal result. The¯nal constant depends on T 1 and a, hence (since T 1 depends only on a) only on a.
Random Systems with Complete Connections
In this appendix we report the basic notions and de¯nitions concerning Random Systems with Complete Connections. For a detailed treatment we refer to [22] . De¯nition 8.10 A Random System with Complete Connections (RSCC) is given by a quadruple f(W; W); (X; X ); u; P g, where:
i. (W; W) and (X; X )) are measurable spaces;
ii. u : W £ X ! W is a (W -X ; W) measurable function;
iii. P is a transition probability function from (W; W) to (X; X ).
A transition probability function (tpf) from (W; W) to (X; X ) is a real valued function de¯ned on W £ X such that P (w; ¢) is a probability measure on (X; X ) for every w and P (¢; A) is a W measurable function for every A 2 X .
To provide motivation for this abstract de¯nition we set up the learning problem discussed in this paper as a RSCC. It may be helpful to think of the variable w as the \subjective" variable and the variable x as the \objective" variable; although in our application they will be have more of a mixed nature. As usual, µ, s, and ¼ denote the vector of weights, the state, and the vector of payo®s respectively. Then we de¯ne w t = (µ t¡1 ; j t¡1 ), and x t = (j t ; ¼ t ) for every t; (W; W) and (X; X ) are the corresponding spaces, with the natural algebras.
The function u describes the learning rule: it maps the two pairs (µ t¡1 ; j t¡1 ), and (j t ; ¼ t ) into the new pair of weight vectors µ t and state j t . Note that the action of u on the state variable is trivial: it simply repeats the value of j t .
The transition probability function P gives the probability over the new pair of state and payo®, for a given vector of weights and state. Note that in general the transition described by P involves elements of a \subjective" type (namely, the vector µ) and of \objective" type (the transition on the states). However in the full information case the tpf P has a very simple form: in fact the distribution on the vector of payo®s ¼ is independent of the vector of weights µ; so P is a tpf from J to X. On the other hand in the partial information case the transition depends also on the variable µ.
Some additional notation is needed in the sequel. x (n) is an element of the form (x 1 ; : : : ; x n ) 2 X n . The function u (n) : W £ X n ! W is de¯ned by the equations u (1) = u and u (n+1) (w; x (n+1) ) = u(u (n) (w; x (n) ); x n+1 ) for n¸1. Since the function u is¯xed throughout, we may shorten u (n) (w; x (n) ) to wx (n) . Also for w 2 W , r an integer, and A 2 X r (the r-times product of the algebra X ) we de¯ne: P r (w; for every integer n and r. Now we introduce two critical assumptions. As it will be clear from the formal de¯nition, they involve at the same time a condition on the random component P and the deterministic component u.
The¯rst one is:
Assumption 8.11 M(n). Let n be a given integer; there exists a real number ± such that: k P n r (w; A) ¡ P n r (v; A) k· 1 ¡ ± for all integers r, w; v 2 W , and A 2 X r .
From our previous remark, in the case of full information the assumption M(n) is an immediate consequence of the assumption on the Markov chain on the state.
The second assumption requires, loosely speaking, that the e®ect of the initial condition w 0 decays fast enough. Let Y´[ r¸1 X r ; for A 2 X , the set Y n (A) is the set of all elements of Y which contain among their components n or more which belong to A. Note that because of the \n or more " condition, Y n+1 (A) µ Y n (A) for every n. If we set A = X we see easily that: ii. if for every integer n we de¯ne:
a n´s up k P (wx (r) ; B) ¡ P (vx (r) ; B) k where the sup is taken over all w; v 2 W , x (r) 2 Y n (A); B 2 X , then X n¸1 a n < 1:
This assumption has a particularly simple form when A = X. In this case the¯rst condition of the assumption 8.12 is trivially satis¯ed; and in the second, from 8.56, the sup is taken over all the sequences x (r) that have length r larger or equal to n. Intuitively the assumption FLS(A,m) in the case A = X requires that the largest di®erence between two probabilities, for two di®erent initial conditions v and w, tends to zero, for any (common) sequence of x's of arbitrary length, fast enough (to be summable).
The basic theorem 2.4.3 of [22] states that if the two assumptions M(n) and FLS(A,m) are satis¯ed for some n; A; m, then the process fw t : t¸0g is ergodic. The theorem also provides estimates on the convergence of the distribution of the process at time t to the unique limit distribution.
